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Abstract
Sorting of people on the labor market not only assures the most productive use of valuable
skills but also generates individual utility gains if people experience an optimal match between
job characteristics and their preferences. Based on individual data on reported satisfaction with
life it is possible to assess these latter gains from matching. We introduce a two-equation ordered
probit model with endogenous switching and study self-selection into government and private
sector jobs. We find considerable gains from matching amounting to an increase in the fraction
of very satisfied workers from 53.8 to 58.8 percent relative to a hypothetical random allocation
of workers to the two sectors.
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1 Introduction
The wealth and happiness of nations depend on the efficient allocation of labor. In order to get the
most out of the resources available in an economy, people must find their proper employer and vice
versa. Market forces are expected to bring about that skills are employed in their most productive
use so that goods and services are supplied at lowest costs. Sorting thus increases the wealth of
nations. This is the usual view about the importance of sorting and matching on the labor market
and its benefits for society. There is, however, another important consequence of sorting for the
happiness of nations. As the marginal worker determines the compensation for labor in its many
specificities, other workers individually get a rent if they experience an optimal match between
job characteristics and their preferences. They benefit from a utility premium, i.e. they get more
utility than what they require to stay in their current job. These private benefits from sorting and
matching are the larger the more heterogeneous the preferences are in a society ceteris paribus.1
Imagine the case of an individual for whom the service for society is close to her heart. She
might enjoy great satisfaction from working in a specific government position. To the extent that
she would be willing to do the job for a lower compensation than the actual salary received (in order
to guarantee the provision of government services at large) she benefits from a utility premium due
to optimal matching.
These arguments about the gains from self-selection involve fundamental aspects of individual
well-being and utility maximization. On the one hand, rents from matching are seen as a substantive
source of well-being. On the other hand, self-selection and accordingly assortative matching are
claims about individual rational decision-making.
Both claims are inherently difficult to evaluate based on revealed behavior and compensating
wage differentials. What are the job characteristics people have formed preferences about? How
can these characteristics be measured and how are the respective preferences distributed?
In this paper, we take advantage of the recent revolution in economics: the measurement of
1An excellent account of the theory of equalizing differences in the labor market is provided in Rosen (1986).
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individual subjective well-being and its application as a proxy measure for utility (e.g. Frey and
Stutzer 2002). Reported life satisfaction is an “all-inclusive” measure or assessment of a situation
based on individuals’ subjective evaluation and weighting. This allows for directly studying the
consequences of individual self-selection. In particular, it is possible to assess people’s potential
gains in well-being from working in their job rather than in some alternative one.2
We proceed in two steps. First, a new econometric tool is developed to study self-selection with
data on reported subjective well-being which are ordinal in nature. The model we introduce is a
two-equation ordered probit model with endogenous switching. This new model formalizes the idea
that (i) the well-being experienced from working in a particular job is individual specific, and that
(ii) people may select the job they work in based on relative advantage (i.e., maximize subjective
well-being). The potential of the model in research on the determinants of individual well-being
(and elsewhere) goes far beyond the application in this paper.
Second, the gains from matching in the labor market are quantified for the specific sorting of
workers into either government or private sector jobs.3 The gains in individual well-being from
matching are obtained by comparing the actual distribution in reported life satisfaction with a
hypothetical one, where workers are randomly allocated to government or private sector jobs,
keeping the size of the two sectors equal to the actual size.
Sorting into government and private sector jobs is given priority in our study for several reasons.
In many countries, an important part of the economic activity takes place in the government sector.
More importantly, however, the government and private sector differ in various institutional and
structural aspects with profound consequences for the workers in these two sectors. First, public
agencies have some special features, most notably the multiplicity of principals and tasks and
2How specific job characteristics are evaluated by workers is studied in a rich related literature on job satisfaction
(for a review, see Warr 1999).
3In our paper, the sorting is based on a full utility comparison, taking into account all relevant job attributes. This
broader view is different from, and complementary to, the traditional focus on public-private sector wage differentials
and related sorting issues (Gregory and Borland, 1999, Borjas, 2002).
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the non-market nature of their output, which prevent the use of explicit incentives. Instead, the
government sector is characterized by low powered incentives, a flat wage structure and promotions
based on the principle of seniority (e.g. Dixit 2002). Second, mission-oriented occupations, i.e.
occupations connected to the provision of collective goods, are highly concentrated in the public
sector (Besley and Ghatak 2005). Finally, public sector employees enjoy a higher job security than
their private sector counterparts. In most countries public servants are better protected against
dismissal and the threat of bankruptcy is virtually absent. Therefore, it stands to reason that the
government sector attracts workers with strong preferences for job security and a strong sense of
responsibility for the society, but, probably less career concerns.4
Circumstantial evidence on heterogeneity in job characteristics and job holders’ preferences in
the public and private sector is provided in the International Social Survey Program on Work
Orientations in 1997. It elicits respondents’ preferences for various job characteristics. Figure 1
shows that government sector employees rate opportunities for advancement as less important, and
job security and usefulness of their work to the society as more important on a six point scale
than private sector employees. Figure 1 also reveals a second important fact. Public employees not
only have different preferences regarding these job characteristics, they also perceive their jobs as
more secure and more useful to society but with less prospects for advancement than employees in
the private sector. It is exactly this match between preferences and job characteristics that entails
potentially important gains in happiness.
[Figure 1 about here]
Given that many forces aggravate the proper sorting of people into government and private jobs,
at least four different outcomes are possible. First, despite the obstacles in market adjustment and
in workers’ self-selection, an almost optimal sorting might be observed. Second, most people might
4The literature has, indeed, documented that civil servants are more risk averse than private sector employees
(Bellante and Link 1981; Hartog et al. 2002) and show a specific public service motivation (e.g. Kelman 1987,
Crewson 1997).
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be better off in the government sector but only a fraction of people can actually work there. This
might be due to rationing and indicates general sector specific rents. Third, the opposite might occur
and almost everybody might be better off in the private sector. This might, for example be the case
if efficiency wages in the private sector create advantages for the insiders but generate involuntary
unemployment, and reduce the attractiveness of public sector employment. Finally, some people
might be in their preferred sector while others are not. Thus there is a partial mismatch involving
costs in terms of well-being.
In our empirical analysis based on the first two waves of the European Social Survey, we find
strong evidence for self-selection, i.e. for correlation between the error terms of the selection and
the outcome equations. The correlation pattern is one of selection based on comparative advantage.
Government sector workers are those who gain the most from being in that sector. As a consequence,
there are considerable gains in subjective well-being from matching. The actual allocation increases
the overall fraction of “very satisfied” workers (reporting a life satisfaction score of 8 or above on
a 0-10 response scale) by five percentage points relative to a hypothetical random allocation of
workers to the two sectors.
In the next section, we present the empirical framework. At the core is a new ordered probit
model with endogenous switching, the parameters of which can be estimated by maximum likeli-
hood. A discussion of general issues regarding the measurement of well-being, and of the data used
from the European Social Survey are part of Section 3. The results are presented in Sections 4.
Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The empirical framework is developed in two steps. First, a simple switching regression model for
two sectors is introduced whereby the selection effect is initially non-negative and is then allowed
to be affected in observed and unobserved ways. Second, the standard regression model is extended
to ordinal dependent variables.
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2.1 A switching regression model of public and private sector well-being
There are two sectors in our model, the government sector (s = 1), and the private sector (s = 0).
The sector-specific equations for individual well-being in the two sectors are
y∗s = x
′βs + us , s = 0, 1 (1)
where x is a (k × 1) vector of explanatory variables that is the same in both equations, and βs are
conforming sector-specific parameter vectors. The sector specific error term us measures preference
heterogeneity. Workers differ in their implicit valuation of the attributes of public and private
sector jobs. For example, for workers with a strong preference for job security and a strong sense of
responsibility for society, attributes typically associated with the public sector, we would observe
in the framework of this model that u1 > u0.5
This is a typical switching regression framework. We observe either individual well-being in
sector 1 (for workers who decided to work in sector 1), or individual well-being in sector 0 (for
workers who decided to work in sector 0), but never both. It is a logical impossibility to know
for sure what the well-being of workers in sector 1 would be if they worked in sector 0, and vice
versa. However, the difference in an individual’s well-being between the two sectors, one observed
and one unobserved, is precisely the worker specific potential utility premium from matching we
are interested in.
Under some additional identifying assumptions, it becomes possible to reconstruct the counter-
factual well-being using econometric techniques. In particular, we assume that
u0 ∼ N(0, 1)
u1 ∼ N(0, 1)
corr(u0, u1) = ρ
5A broader concept of preference heterogeneity allows for heterogeneity in the slope parameters βs as well. In
a polar case, βsi = βi, i.e., differences in slopes across sectors are entirely due to worker heterogeneity. Such
heterogeneity would have some effect on the interpretation, as indicated in the results section below, but would not
invalidate the model structure per-se.
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The normalization of the variances is introduced already at this stage in anticipation of the fact that
only class membership of a partition of the real line is observed, i.e. the estimable model will have
an ordered probit structure. Otherwise, the model has all the features of the standard Roy model
for two continous outcomes (see Roy, 1951, Borjas, 1987). If ρ > 0, then workers with an above
average well-being in sector 1 also enjoy above average well-being in sector 0. The extreme case
would be a perfect positive correlation, such that ρ = +1. In this case, u0 = u1; this is tantamount
to assuming that people differ in their unobserved intrinsic well-being level (e.g., personality), but
that these differences are completely unrelated to the sector they might work in. If ρ is less than
one, there are sector specific gains to be made, i.e., people have comparative well-being gains in one
of the sectors, and we would expect that people self-select into the sectors based on this comparative
advantage. Workers with a positive preference for sector 1 will end up in sector 1, and workers
with a positive preference for sector 0 will work in sector 0.
This idea can be formalized by assuming that individuals self-select into sectors 0 and 1 based
on maximization of their well-being. In its strictest form, the maximization hypothesis implies that
we observe workers in sector 1 whenever y∗1 > y∗0, and in sector 0 whenever y∗0 > y∗1. In this case,
the selection equation is
s =

1 if u1 − u0 > x′(β0 − β1)
0 if u1 − u0 ≤ x′(β0 − β1)
(2)
To answer the question whether workers who chose to work in sector s have a higher or lower well-
being than a worker randomly assigned to that sector, i.e., whether they are positively or negatively
selected, the key parameter is the correlation between u1 − u0 and us. As is well known, in this
set-up,
E(y∗s |x, s = 1) = x′β1 + E(u1|u1 − u0 > x′(β0 − β1))
= x′β1 + corr(u1, u1 − u0)φ(x
′(β1 − β0)/σ)
Φ(x′(β1 − β0)/σ) (3)
and
E(y∗s |x, s = 0) = x′β0 + E(u0|u1 − u0 ≤ x′(β0 − β1))
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= x′β0 − corr(u0, u1 − u0) φ(x
′(β1 − β0)/σ)
1− Φ(x′(β1 − β0)/σ) (4)
where σ =
√
Var(u1 − u0). Under the assumptions of the model,
corr(us, u1 − u0) = (2s− 1)
√
(1− ρ)/2 s = 0, 1
If s = 1, the correlation is bounded from below at zero and the overall selection effect is nonnegative.
Those more likely to select into sector 1 have an above average well-being in that sector. For
example, for ρ = 0, corr(u1, u1 − u0) = 1/
√
2.
If s = 0, the correlation is bounded from above at zero. Again, the overall selection effect is
nonnegative. Those less likely to select into sector 1, and more likely into sector 0, have above
average well-being in sector 0. Hence, both groups are positively selected for all interior values of
ρ. Only if ρ = +1 does the correlation, and thus the self-selection bias, disappear.6
In important ways, this selection model is too restrictive. At an empirical level, we would prefer a
model that does not restrict the selection effect to be non-negative a priori. At a theoretical level,
individual maximization of well-being may not be the only determinant of sector allocation, for
example due to demand constraints. If the number of people wanting to work in a given sector (the
labor supply) exceeds the number of available jobs (the labor demand), the selection rule depends
on a rationing mechanism. While we do not model this mechanism explicitly, we can allow for the
possibility that it affects selection both in observed and unobserved ways. Let
s =

1 if ε > −z′γ
0 if ε ≤ −z′γ
(5)
where
ε ∼ N(0, 1)
corr(ε, u1) = ρ1
corr(ε, u0) = ρ0
6This result differs from the Roy model, where negative selection is possible. Negative selection in sector 0 requires
that ρ > 0 and σ0 < σ1. With variances normalized to one, this case is precluded in the present setup.
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Such a model allows for rather general forms of selection. z should include all variables that
determine well-being (i.e., x). In addition, it can include variables that affect the demand for
workers in a given sector, but not the supply. One example would be citizenship if, as is the case
in many countries, all or a part of employment in the government sector is reserved to citizens of
that country. In addition, the model allows for very general patterns of selection on unobservables.
Thus demand restrictions may also operate on workers’ characteristics that are not observed by the
analyst, and there may be individual specific random effects on top of that. Econometrically, it is
possible to estimate ρ0 and ρ1 separately.
The following cases can be distinguished:
a) there is self-selection based on comparative advantage. This occurs whenever ρ1 > ρ0.
b) there is self-selection based on comparative disadvantage. This occurs whenever ρ1 < ρ0.
c) there is no self-selection based on comparative advantage or disadvantage. This occurs
whenever ρ1 = ρ0.7 This is not the same as saying that there is no selection problem. The well-
being of private sector workers is still not a valid counterfactual for the wellbeing of public sector
worker in the private sector. As long as ρ1 = ρ0 6= 0 there is selection based on absolute advantage
or disadvantage. In this case, the simple model does not estimate the causal effect. There is,
however, no gain from matching on unobservables. I.e., reallocating workers across sectors will not
make a difference to aggregate well-being.
2.2 An ordered response model with endogenous switching
In this section, we present an extension of the standard regression model to ordinal dependent
variables. This is necessary since the outcomes y∗0 and y∗1 are unobserved, in our case people’s
true well-being. Instead, we observe the ordered discrete responses ys = 0, . . . , 10, i.e., people’s
7This point is easiest understood from the conditional expectations in the latent model, displayed in equations
(3) and (4), from where we see that moving a sector 1 worker to sector 0 leads to a well-being change E(y∗0 |x, s =
1)− E(y∗1 |x, s = 1) = x′(β0 − β1) that is equal to minus the well-being change of moving a sector 0 worker to sector
1, as long as ρ1 = ρ0.
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judgements about their subjective well-being, such that
ys = j if and only if κs,j < y∗s ≤ κs,j+1 (6)
where y∗s = x′βs + us, s = 0, 1, and the threshold values κs,j , j = 0, 1, . . . , 10 form a partition of
the real line i.e., κ0 = −∞, κ11 =∞, and κs,j+1 > κs,j ∀j. This is not an ordinary ordered probit
model since the probability of observing ys = j depends on the outcome of the selection variable,
and the two are correlated. We have
P (y1 = j, s = 1) = P (κ1,j − x′β1 < u1 ≤ κ1,j+1 − x′β1, ε > −z′γ)
= P (κ1,j+1 − x′β1 < u1,−ε < z′γ)− P (κ1,j − x′β1 < u1,−ε < z′γ)
P (y0 = j, s = 0) = P (κ0,j+1 − x′β0 < u0 ≤ κ0,j − x′β0, ε ≤ −z′γ)
= P (κ0,j+1 − x′β0 < u0, ε ≤ −z′γ)− P (κ0,j − x′β0 < u0,−ε ≤ −z′γ)
If u1 and u0 were both uncorrelated with ε, the joint probabilities could be factored into a standard
ordered probit part and a standard probit part. With correlation, such a factorization is not
possible. Then, for ε ∼ N(0, 1), u1 ∼ N(0, 1), u0 ∼ N(0, 1), corr(ε, u1) = ρ1, and corr(ε, u0) = ρ0,
P (y1 = j, s = 1|x, z) = Φ2(κ1,j+1 − x′β1, z′γ,−ρ1)− Φ2(κ1,j − x′β1, z′γ,−ρ1)) (7)
P (y0 = j, s = 0|x, z) = Φ2(κ0,j+1 − x′β0,−z′γ, ρ0)− Φ2(κ0,j − x′β0,−z′γ, ρ0) (8)
where Φ2 denotes the cumulative density function of the standard bivariate normal distribution.8
The parameters of the model, θ = (κ1, κ0, β1, β0, γ, ρ1, ρ0)′, can be estimated by maximum likelihood
without much difficulty. Given a sample of tuples of independent observations (yi, si, xi, zi), the
likelihood function is simply
L(θ; y, s, x, z) =
n∏
i=1
P (ys, s|x, z) (9)
Under the assumptions of the model, the ML estimator has all the desirable large sample properties.
8The trivariate normal assumptiuon for the errors in the latent model, if combined with a threshold mechanism,
allows for very general distributions for the discrete outcomes, including skewed and multi-model distributions. The
main restriction implied by the normal assumption is the linearity of the conditional expectation function (cef) of
the outcome error given the selection error. Linear cef’s are, of course, routinely used in econometrics.
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2.3 Implementation Issues
First, we estimate for each sector a cardinalized ordered probit model by OLS, as suggested by
van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004).9 Based on this method, the threshold values κ1-κ10 are
obtained from the marginal distribution of y. Let pk denote the proportion of observations in
the sample with y < k. Then κ˜k = Φ−1(pk). Moreover, the conditional expectation of y∗|y = k
can be estimated as (φ(κ˜k)− φ(κ˜k+1))/(Φ(κ˜k+1)− Φ(κ˜k)). The slope parameters are obtained by
regressing these conditional expectations on x, separately for the two sectors. Finally, the starting
values for the selection equation are obtained from a few Newton-Raphson steps of a Logit model.
The resulting parameters are divided by 1.6 to approximate the probit coefficients.
The full simultaneous log-likelihood function is then maximized using the BFGS algorithm with
numerical first and second derivatives as implemented in GAUSS. We experienced no convergence
difficulties. Moreover, different starting values led to the same ML estimates.
3 Data
3.1 Reported Subjective Well-Being
In order to study the welfare gains from matching directly (as proposed in our model), individual
well-being has to be measured. We take advantage of the insights in psychology and their transfer to
economics on the valuable information in people’s reports of their satisfaction with life or happiness.
We take these reports as an indicator of individual well-being.10
Following the economic tradition on relying on the judgment of the persons directly involved,
people are considered to be the best judges of the overall quality of their life. With the help
of representative surveys, it is possible to get indications of individuals’ evaluation of their life
satisfaction. Behind the score indicated by respondents lies a cognitive assessment on the extent
9Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) refer to this model as Probit-OLS.
10A comprehensive review is provided in the edited volume titled Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psy-
chology (Kahneman et al. 1999).
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to which they judge the overall quality of their lives in a favorable way. This includes the match
between their preferred characteristics of a job and the ones they actually experience. Measures
of life satisfaction and happiness passed a series of validation exercises and seem to significantly
correlate with true positive inner feelings (see Frey and Stutzer 2002a;b for introductions to the
economics of happiness and references to the validation literature in psychology).
Various contributions demonstrate that the study of data on individual life satisfaction and
happiness can provide new and complementary insights in economics. Recent findings are with
regard to the macro-economic determinants of individual well-being (e.g. Di Tella, MacCulloch
and Oswald 2003), the relationship between income and happiness (e.g. Boes and Winkelmann
2004, Frijters et al. 2004, Stutzer 2004, Luttmer 2005), the valuation of public goods (e.g. Frey,
Luechinger and Stutzer 2004, van Praag and Baarsma 2005) or the evaluation of public policy (e.g.
Gruber and Mullainathan 2005).
Data on reported subjective well-being are ordinal in nature. By this we mean that the par-
ticular numerical labels attached to the response scale, here y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10}, provide an ordering
only. Any monotonic transformation z = g(y), g′(y) > 0, conveys the same information. A direct
consequence is that, strictly speaking, expected values and regression models are not meaningful
for such data. Since there are only 11 discrete outcomes, it is better to model the response prob-
abilities directly, accounting for the ordering. The ordered probit and logit models provide such a
framework. Our model with endogenous switching outlined in subsection 2.2 is a generalization of
the standard ordered probit model. Although often not realized, the ordered probit model imposes
an implicit cardinalization as well, in the way the regressors affect the probabilities (Boes and
Winkelmann, 2004, van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). Usually, interpersonal comparability
is assumed. This requirement is however softened in our framework allowing sector specific levels
of reported subjective well-being.
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3.2 Data Set and Sample Description
In our analysis, we use data from the first (2002) wave and the first edition of the second (2004)
wave of the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a repeated cross-section survey covering
more than 20 European nations.
Our definition of government sector includes people working either in the public administration,
defense, compulsory social security or in education. The dummy variable is constructed on the basis
of information about the respondents’ industry (according to the EU industry classification, NACE
Rev. 1). Other employed or self-employed people are in the reference category; respondents that
were neither employed nor self-employed the week preceding the interview or whose main income
source is neither wage nor income from self-employment are excluded. In order to increase the
homogeneity of the sample, the analysis is restricted to non-transformation countries leaving us
with a total of 29,584 observations from people active on the labor market.11 The sample averages
of the explanatory variables are displayed in the last column of Table 1: the proportion of public
sector workers is 16 percent, the average age is 41 years, 45 percent are women, 58 percent are
married, and the average education level corresponds to 12.9 years of schooling.
The dependent variable is the overall satisfaction with life, elicited with the following question:
’All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ Individuals are
asked to state their life satisfaction on a scale from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely
satisfied). For our sample of European workers, average satisfaction with life is 7.42 score points
with a standard deviation of 1.93 . There is a large fraction of people reporting high satisfaction
scores: 10.8% report 10, 18.4% report 9 and 29.7% report 8. Only a small fraction of workers
reports low satisfaction scores: 0.8 % report 0, 0.5% report 1, 1.1% report 2 and 2.4% report 3.
11The sample includes observations from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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36.4% report scores between 4 and 7.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 shows that there are some sector specific differences: a higher proportion of government
sector employees responds with values 8, 9 or 10.
4 Results
The empirical findings are presented in three subsections. First, the regression results and the test
on endogenous selection are shown and explained. Second, the welfare gains from matching due
to selection based on unobservables are calculated. Third, the importance of selection based on
returns to observables is assessed.
4.1 Endogenous Selection
The estimation results are shown in Tables 1-3. A total of four different specifications was estimated.
The first two specifications go a step back and neglect the possibility of self-selection into the
government and private sector. We display results for the simple pooled ordered probit estimator
with a sector dummy only. There are two such models, one without further control variables, and
one with a set of six additional control variables (household size; female; a second order polynomial
in age; married; years of schooling). Note that it is important in this context not to control
for salaries, or indeed for any job-specific attributes. Otherwise, it is not possible to interpret
satisfaction differentials as indicators of sector-specific rents, based on how individuals value the
bundle of attributes in each sector.
The results of the simple model without controls show a positive and statistically significant
effect of government sector on satisfaction with life. Employees in that sector unambiguously have
a higher predicted probability of reporting very high levels of satisfaction than others. The second
column shows that this estimated effect is biased due to omitted variables. Once we control for
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further factors relevant for well-being, and thus compare workers in the public and private sector
who are otherwise the same (with respect to those characteristics), there is no longer a statistically
significant differential in life satisfaction.
The third and fourth specification now allow for endogenous selection. The explanatory variables
are the same as in Table 1 in each of the following models. The difference is, of course, that the effect
of these variables becomes sector-specific in the switching ordered probit models. The restriction of
equal effects is tested and rejected in both cases. The model with endogenous switching is estimated
in two different versions, presented in Tables 2 and 3 (in both tables, the estimated cut-off values
are suppressed). The base model in Table 2 uses a single instrument, citizen status. In many
countries, government jobs are, at least partly, available for citizens only. In Table 3, an additional
instrument is used, an indicator whether the father worked in a modern professional occupation.12
All in all, the results display a remarkable stability, in particular the two key parameters of
the model, the correlation between the selection equation and the two outcome equations. In each
case, the correlation between selection into the government sector and satisfaction in the government
sector is close to zero and statistically insignificant, whereas the correlation between selection into
the government sector and satisfaction in the private sector is large, negative, and statistically
significant. Thus, there is statistical evidence for endogenous selection, and joint estimation is
an improvement over separate estimation based on an independence assumption. We will turn to
a detailed interpretation of these correlations in the next subsections. Before that, some further
aspects of the model are noteworthy.
Clearly, there is evidence for parameter heterogeneity across the two outcome equations. For
12Personal contacts are an important source of information about the availability of jobs, but also about job
conditions and affect job selection accordingly. In the USA, one third of newly hired employees in the public admin-
istration learnt about their job from friends and family members (Lewis and Clark 2002). Father’s occupation is thus
a potential instrument. Unfortunately, the dataset contains no information whether the father was employed in the
government or in the private sector. However, a large fraction of people in a modern professional occupation works
in the government sector. So, we take the latter information for the father as an instrument.
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example, in the model with a single instrument, household size has a significant positive effect on
life satisfaction in the private sector, but not so in the public sector. More intruguingly, one can
compare the effect of explanatory variables in the selection and outcome equations. Education,
for example, has no effect on well-being, but it is highly significant in the selection equation.
Apparently, this factor does affect selection not on the side of labor supply (what employees want)
but rather from the labor demand side (what employers want). The same can be said about the
variable female.
Just the opposite case arises for the variable “marital status”. Here, there are significant effects
in both outcome equations but it is insignificant in the selection equation. One has to be cautious
when comparing coefficients across outcome equations, since their relationship to the outcome
distribution is moderated through thresholds that vary in the two equations. However, when we
compute the predicted effect of marriage on the probability of being very satisfied (a score of 8
or higher on the 0-10 scale), for an otherwise average person, one finds indeed a stronger effect in
the government sector (+10 percentage points compared to +6.7 percentage points). One would
therefore expect that married people select themselves into the government sector because the
benefits from that characteristic is largest there. While the positive estimate of being married in
the selection equation points in the right direction, the hypothesis of no selection based on marital
status cannot be rejected.13
4.2 Selection based on unobservables
Figure 3 shows the influence of self-selection on the probability of reporting a high level of life
satisfaction (a score of 8 or higher on the 0-10 scale). Formally,
P (ys ≥ 8|ε) = P (y∗s ≥ κs,8|ε)
13A possible explanation for the absence of an effect in the selection equation is that the differences in returns to
marriage reflect sector-independent preference heterogeneity. In this interpretation, government sector workers would
retain their above average well-being premium from being married even if they were to move to the private sector.
Hence, marital status has no effect on sector choice.
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= 1− P (x′βs + us < κs,8|ε)
= 1− Φ
(
κs,8 − x′βs − ρsε√
1− ρ2s
)
Figure 2 plots this probability for s = 0, 1, for an average person (x = x¯), and for ε ∈ (−2, 2), based
on parameter estimates from Table 2. Since the marginal distribution of ε is standard normal, this
range covers approximately 95 percent of all possible cases. A large ε means that the person is
likely to work in the government sector. The selection rule formally requires that εi > z′iγ, so that
the cut-off for selection into the government sector is individual specific. However, we know that
16 percent of all persons in the sample work in the government sector. Therefore, an otherwise
average person is allocated to the government sector as long as ε > Φ−1(0.84) ≈ 1.
From Figure 3, we see that predicted government workers (those with a high ε in the selection
equation) tend to be less satisfied than predicted private sector workers, regardless of the sector
they work in. However, they would be much worse off if allocated to the private sector. Thus they
gain the most from working in the government sector, which is a manifestation of self-selection
based on comparative advantage.
[Figure 3 about here]
The two satisfaction curves in Figure 3 intersect when u is approximately minus one. Thus
it would be optimal if all workers on the left of the intersection, where workers maximize their
satisfaction by working in the private sector, would actually work in the private sector. Similarly,
all workers with ε ≥ −1 should work in the government sector. This does not happen however
since, as we saw above, much fewer people work in the government sector. The actual threshold
is around ε ≥ +1. Within the formal structure of our model, the fact that more workers find it
optimal to work in the government sector than actually do can be explained by a restricted labor
demand in that sector. The fact that there are queues for government jobs is well known and has
been analysed before (e.g., Krueger, 1988). The novel insight here is that into the nature of the
rationing mechanism, namely that government workers are those who gain most from working in
16
that sector.
Finally, we also observe that private sector workers have on average only a slightly lower prob-
ability of reporting a high satisfaction than government workers. This can be seen from Figure 3,
by averaging over the government satisfaction locus for ε ≥ 1, and over the private sector satis-
faction locus for ε < 1. Formally, the probability of high satisfaction for an average person in the
government sector is
P (ys ≥ 8|ε ≥ c) = 1− Φ2(κ1,8 − x
′β1,−c,−ρ1)
Φ(−c) (10)
whereas it is
P (ys ≥ 8|ε < c) = 1− Φ2(κ0,8 − x
′β0, c, ρ0)
1− Φ(−c) (11)
in the private sector, for c = 1. If we evaluate these expressions at the sample means of the explana-
tory variables and the parameter estimates, we obtain ̂P (ys ≥ 8|s = 1) = 0.612 and ̂P (ys ≥ 8|s = 0) =
0.577. Thus, government workers have on average a slightly higher probability of being highly satis-
fied. We have seen a similar result already in the pooled ordered probit estimates with government
sector dummy variable (Table 1). Hidden behind this average effect is a large amount of individual
heterogeneity and a self-selection process based on comparative advantage. The “treatment effect
on the treated” is indeed much larger, as the above analysis has demonstrated.
4.3 Gains from Matching
The gains from matching are illustrated in Figure 4, where we display the predicted aggregate
happiness distribution under two scenarios. The first one, in dark grey bars, shows the actual
distribution in the sample. Hence, it reflects the choices of people and incorporates the gains from
sorting and matching. The second scenario is a counterfactual one. We ask the question, what
would happen if people were randomly assigned to the two sectors, without taking the preference
heterogeneity into account, while keeping the sector sizes unchanged, i.e., 16 percent of the worker
population are assigned to the government sector, and 84 percent are assigned to the private sector.
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For a worker with average characteristics, we obtain the predicted happiness distribution as
̂P (y = j|x¯) = 0.16 ∗ ̂P (y1 = j|x¯) + 0.84 ∗ ̂P (y0 = j|x¯)
We see that the sorting based on comparative advantage shifts the happiness distribution to the
right relative to the random matching case. For example, the probability of being very satisfied
( ̂P (y ≥ 8)) is increased by 5 percentage points due to endogenous matching.
[Figure 4 about here]
The graphical and numerical results thus indicate significant welfare gains from sorting and
matching in the labor market that were not and could not be measured with traditional approaches.
Accordingly, there are no previous results, we are aware of, about the gains from matching that
could serve as a benchmark to assess the size of the calculated effect. There are, however, many
studies estimating the loss in subjective well-being due to individual unemployment (see Frey and
Stutzer 2002, chapter 5 for a review), probably the most extreme case of a mismatch. For the same
set of countries in the ESS, we find that the fraction of employed or self-employed people reporting
a satisfaction score of 8 or more is 57.4 percent while it is only 33.5 percent for unemployed people.
Thus the gains from sectoral matching shift about a fifth as many people into the category of very
satisfied people as employment as such.14
Moreover, the overall result hides large gains from matching for people working in the govern-
ment sector and small average losses for people working in the private sector. The latter effect is
due to the politically determined size of the government sector restricting access to government
employment. It means that with random allocation, on average, 16 percent of the private sector
workers were to be employed in the government sector that would have made them better off, on
average. However, not all people employed in the private sector would have benefited from random
allocation. As seen in Figure 3, those most likely to work in the private sector are indeed better
14 We are aware that the raw difference in the fraction of very satisfied people between employed and unemployed
people does not account for selection and differences in baseline satisfaction, but rather serves as a first approximation.
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off in the private than in the government sector and thus benefit from sorting as well.
4.4 Selection based on returns to observables
We have touched earlier upon selection on observables, when we discussed the sector specific differ-
ences in the coefficients. For example, we observed that the well-being premium for being married
is larger in the government sector than in the private sector. Thus, one might expect, based on an
argument of relative gain, that married people have a higher probability of being in the government
sector, ceteris paribus. Yet, the marital status variable was insignificant (albeit positive) in the
selection equation.
While the evidence is thus inconclusive for this particular variable, we can instead assess the
overall evidence for positive or negative selection based on observable characteristics across the
board, taking all of them into account simultaneously. Let x¯1 denote the sample mean of these
characteristics among government employees, and x¯0 the sample mean among private sector em-
ployees. The predicted satisfaction distribution of an average government worker in the government
sector, unconditional on selection but conditional on x¯1, is then
̂P (y1 = j|x¯1) = Φ(κˆ1,j+1 − x¯′1βˆ1)− Φ(κˆ1,j+1 − x¯′1βˆ1)
whereas the predicted satisfaction distribution of an average private sector worker in the government
sector is
̂P (y1 = j|x¯0) = Φ(κˆ1,j+1 − x¯′0βˆ1)− Φ(κˆ1,j+1 − x¯′0βˆ1)
Based on our parameter estimates and sample means it turns out that the difference between these
distributions is small, althoug there is some evidence for positive selection based on observables.
For example, the predicted probability of being very satisfied in the government sector (P (y1 ≥ 8))
is by 0.4 percentage points higher among goverment workers than among private sector workers.
Similarly, the predicted probability of being very satisfied in the private sector (P (y0 ≥ 8)) is by
0.2 percentage points higher among private sector workers than among goverment workers.15
15These estimates are based on the assumption that differences in returns are sector related. If they reflect
19
5 Concluding Remarks
Individuals choose their jobs to attain an optimal match between job characteristics and their
preferences. As far as an individual is not the marginal worker in a job, he or she benefits from
a rent, i.e. a utility premium from matching. In general terms of traditional welfare economics,
workers’ sorting maximizes consumer and producer rents. Empirically, it is very difficult to get
a grip on this fundamental source of well-being in society. Traditional approaches are based on
the theory of equalizing differences and are restricted to analyze observed behavior at the margin.
Thereby, the degree of preference heterogeneity and resulting welfare gains from matching remain
very difficult to take into consideration.
Here, we propose a completely different approach. People’s reports of their subjective well-
being are taken as a proxy measure for their utility. It thus becomes possible to address the
welfare gains from matching with minimal structural assumptions and no information about specific
job characteristics in the two sectors. We introduce a two-equation ordered probit model with
endogenous switching. This is the most basic model to capture the idea that there are individual
specific gains in well-being from working in a particular sector and that people self-select into
sectors according to these relative advantages.
The model is applied to study sorting between government and private sector jobs for a sample
of 29,584 workers from 18 European countries. We find that there is sectoral sorting based on
relative advantage. The resulting gains in subjective well-being relative to a random allocation of
workers to the two sectors are considerable: The fraction of very satisfied workers increases from
53.8 to 58.8 percent.
There are at least one implication of substance and one of methodology in research on individual
well-being from this study. First, the study highlights matching on the labor market as a potentially
preference heterogeneity instead, the gains from matching on observables will be smaller, or may even disappear
altogether. However, in either case, most of the gains from matching remain as they result from selection based on
unobservables.
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very important determinant of well-being in society. We expect that these gains in well-being
depend on labor market institutions. In fact, an important motivation for state unemployment
benefits is the concern that gains from matching are lost if people cannot afford to search for
appropriate employment.
Second, the empirical findings make clear that the well-being gains from acting in a particular
environment like working in the government rather than in the private sector are individual specific.
In situations, where people have choice, this leads to self-selection. Accordingly, the well-being
consequences of different environmental conditions can neither be assessed from simply comparing
individuals’ well-being across environments nor from studying the changes in well-being for those
who voluntarily change environments. The latter advice to caution applies also to panel studies
taking into account individual specific fixed effects. In such a framework, for example, the effect
of having a public sector job on individuals’ well-being is evaluated based on people who change
sectors (see e.g. Heywood et al. 2002). On the one hand, this might lead to a systematic over-
estimation of the benefits from public employment because only those people who benefit the most
will be observed as movers. On the other hand, if only a small fraction is moving, the well-being
gains might be under-estimated because the gains of public employment of those already in the
public sector are not taken into account. 16 Our approach with endogenous switching handles these
difficulties.
The implications of our model do not only apply to the specific case of sectoral selection on the
labor market but to all the situations where people can choose their environment. This asks for a
careful interpretation of previous findings in economic research on people’s happiness. For example,
16Moreover, panel analyses of this sort rely on the identifying assumption that the only unobserved individual
specific change is the change in the environment. However, whenever this change in the environment is chosen,
this assumption may not hold. The change itself indicates that the decision calculus of the individual has altered.
According to economic theory, the change in the environment is driven by either a change in constraints and /or
preferences. It is, then, likely that these changes in the constraints and/or preferences have direct effects on life
satisfaction beyond inducing individuals to change the environment.
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the findings in cohort and panel studies on the correlation between marital status and subjective
well-being (e.g. Easterlin 2005, Stutzer and Frey 2006) or education, the number of children, etc.
and subjective well-being might seriously change. In contrast, self-selection might play a minor
role in assessing the psychic costs of unemployment (e.g. Clark and Oswald 1994, Winkelmann and
Winkelmann 1998) or the welfare consequences of democratic institutions (e.g. Frey and Stutzer
2000). We see our contribution as a first step to a better understanding of the gains in happiness
where people self-select into situations that match their preferences best.
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Table 1. Life Satisfaction and Sector of Employment:
Ordered Probit Estimates
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction
Model 1 Model 2 Mean
Public sector 0.080** 0.022 0.16
(0.016) (0.016)
Household size 0.093** 1.66
(0.016)
Female 0.072** 0.45
(0.012)
Age∗10−1 -0.343** 4.09
(0.036)
Age squared∗10−3 0.401** 1.80
(0.042)
Married 0.177** 0.58
(0.014)
Years of schooling∗10−1 0.242** 1.29
(0.016)
κ1 -2.417 -2.526
κ2 -2.227 -2.335
κ3 -1.971 -2.076
κ4 -1.656 -1.757
κ5 -1.406 -1.504
κ6 -0.982 -1.076
κ7 -0.703 -0.792
κ8 -0.210 -0.293
κ9 0.562 0.486
κ10 1.251 1.179
Log-Likelihood -57028.5 -56768.0
Number of observations 29584 29584
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2004, pooled data.
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Table 2. Ordered Probit Model with Endogenous Switching:
Single Instrument
Life satisfaction equations Selection equation
Public sector Private sector
Household size 0.045 0.075** 0.040
(0.043) (0.018) (0.025)
Female 0.070 -0.020 0.308**
(0.065) (0.013) (0.017)
Age∗10−1 -0.515** -0.355** 0.295**
(0.110) (0.037) (0.058)
Age squared∗10−3 0.548** 0.386** -0.219**
(0.123) (0.045) (0.069)
Married 0.262** 0.146** 0.031
(0.039) (0.015) (0.022)
Years of schooling∗10−1 0.032 0.005 0.913**
(0.174) (0.023) (0.024)
Citizen 0.499**
(0.048)
ρ -0.170 -0.684**
(0.229) (0.031)
Log-Likelihood -68986.7
Number of observations 29584
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2004, pooled data.
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Table 3. Ordered Probit Model with Endogenous Switching:
Two Instruments
Life satisfaction equations Selection equation
Public sector Private sector
Household size 0.046 0.075** 0.041
(0.043) (0.018) (0.025)
Female 0.082 -0.020 0.309**
(0.058) (0.013) (0.017)
Age∗10−1 -0.507** -0.356** 0.301**
(0.109) (0.037) (0.059)
Age squared∗10−3 0.543** 0.386** -0.224**
(0.123) (0.045) (0.069)
Married 0.265** 0.146** 0.031
(0.038) (0.015) (0.022)
Years of schooling∗10−1 0.064 0.006 0.899**
(0.153) (0.023) (0.024)
Citizen 0.503**
(0.048)
Father in modern 0.191**
professional occupation (0.034)
ρ -0.126 -0.684**
(0.201) (0.031)
Log-Likelihood -68971.8
Number of observations 29584
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2004, pooled data.
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Figure 1: Differences in preferences and perceptions of job characteristics between government and
private sector workers in 23 countries 1997 .
Notes: The bars reflect the mean differences of the answers, elicited on a six point scale, between public and
private sector employees; ∗∗ is significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ at the 5 percent level, and (∗) at the 10 percent
level. The differences are calculated based on the pooled sample for all 25 countries in the ISSP, except the USA
and the Netherlands where the required sector information is not available. Standard errors are adjusted for possible
clustering at the country level. People working in publicly owned firms, cooperatives and non-profit organization are
excluded. The numbers of observations vary between 12,365 and 14,480.
Source: Own calculations based on ISSP 1997.
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Figure 2: Happiness distribution for government and private sector employees.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2004, pooled data.
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of being very happy (a score of 8 or above) for government and
private sector employees by ε (the error in the selection equation).
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Figure 4: Predicted aggregate happiness distribution (0-10 scale) under self-selection (dark grey)
and random matching (light grey).
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